Abstract-A Gaussian MISO (multiple input single output) channel is considered where a transmitter is communicating to a receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. The transmitter is equipped with multiple antennas, while the receiver and the eavesdropper each have a single anteniia. The traismitter maximizes the communication rate, while concealing the message from the eavesdropper. The channel input is restricted to Gaussian signalling, with no preprocessing of information. For these channel inputs, and under different channel fading assumptions, optimal transmission strategies are found, in terms of the input covariance matrices. It is shown that, the optimal communication strategy in all cases, is beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent openness of wireless communication calls for careful security considerations. Information theoretic security of wireless channels has received a great deal of attention recently, and different wireless channel models and their security limits have been extensively studied. The basic model used in these studies is introduced by Wyner [1L], where he considers a wire-tap single user channel. The measure of secrecy is the message equivocation rate at the wire-tapper, which is defined as the entropy of the message at the wiretapper, given the wire-tapper's observation. The wire-tapping channel is assumed to be a degraded version of the channel from the sender to the legitimate receiver. This is in fact a reasonable assumption in a wired channel.
In [2], Wyner's model is generalized to a broadcast channel in which a common message is transmitted to two users while a private message is transmitted to only one of the users, and the other user should be kept as ignorant of this private message as possible. Here, the channels to the two users are not degraded versions of each other. Capacity-equivocation region for this channel is specified. When the user's channel is "more capable" compared to the eavesdropping channel, it is shown that the capacity-equivocation region is as Wyner's.
Scalar Gaussian wire-tap channel is considered in [3] , and its capacity-equivocation region is characterized. Secrecy in multiple access channels (MAC) is studied in [4] , [5] and [6] In [4] a generalized MAC is considered where the users can listen to the channel. Each user has private, as well as common information to transmit. There is no external eavesdropper, however, the private information of each user is to be kept as confidential as possible from the other user The users listen to the channel, but their encoding functions are not affected by their eavesdropping information The level ulukus@umd.edu of secrecy is measured by equivocation. When only one user has confidential information for the receiver, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are provided, and the secrecy capacity region is specified. In [5] as well, there is no external eavesdropper. A two user system is considered where both users communicate to the receiver, while one of them is permitted to eavesdrop on the other user. The Gaussian MAC is studied in [6] . The setting in [6] is different than [4] and [5] in that, an external eavesdropper is present, and the users do not eavesdrop on each other. A new secrecy constraint suitable for a multiple user system is defined. Using Gaussian codebooks, achievable rate-equivocation regions and their corresponding power allocation strategies are provided.
The Gaussian multiple input multiple output (MIMO) wiretap channel is studied in [7] . An achievable scheme is proposed where the user tries to put the eavesdropper in relative disadvantage by transmitting noise in the user channel's null space. The single input multiple output (SIMO) Gaussian channel is considered in [8] . There, the existence of an equivalent scalar Gaussian channel is shown and consequently, the results of [3] are used to derive the capacity-equivocation region.
Secrecy in single input single output (SISO) fading channels is studied in [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] and [14] . [10] investigates the outage performance.
[ 1], [12] and [13] specify the secrecy capacity, when full channel state information is available to all the parties. [13] further finds the secrecy capacity without the eavesdropper channel state information for a special fading eavesdropper channel. In [14] , only the eavesdropping channel is assumed to experience fading, and the main channel is considered to be non-fading. The eavesdropping channel fading realization is assumed to be known only to the eavesdropper. Achievable secrecy rates under Gaussian signalling are characterized. We consider a Gaussian MISO channel under various assumptions on the channel attenuations. We first assume that the channel attenuations are constants, known to all the parties. We characterize the maximum secrecy rate achievable through Gaussian signalling and show that the Gaussian signalling that achieves the best secrecy rate is of beamformig nature. [9] reports a similar result as derived in this paper however these similar results are derived independently and concurrently. Our problem is different than [7] in that we seek the optimum Gaussian signalling, while [7] investigates the performance of one specific Gaussian strategy The results of [8] cannot be extended to our case, since the method used in [8] to find an equivalent scalar Gaussian channel cannot be used for a MISO Gaussian channel.
Next, we assume that the eavesdropping channel experiences fading, where the realizations of the fading coefficients are not knowxn to the transmitter. We characterize achievable secrecy rates through Gaussian signalling. We show that the optimal Gaussian signalling has a unit-rank covariance matrix, and therefore, beamformning is optimal in this case as well.
However, while the beamforming vector in the non-fading case depends on both channel attenuation vectors from the transmitter to the receiver and the eavesdropper, in this case, it depends only on the channel attenuation vector from the transmitter to the receiver. As a result of the optimality of beamforming, our MISO system reduces to a SISO system. We identify conditions under which, positive secrecy rates are achievable. Our formulation is partially similar to that of [14] . [14] treats the SISO system, and we study the MISO problem, but in both cases, the main channel is constant, while the eavesdropping channel is fading and unknown to the transmitter. After we reduce the MISO system to a SISO system, our results overlap significantly with those of [14] .
Here again, the results of this paper and those of [14] have been derived independently and concurrently. Our results are different than [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] and [14] , in that they all consider single antennas for all the parties, while multiple transmit antennas are considered for the transmitter here.
We use the following notations throughout this paper. Ideally, one should solve (3) for the optimal joint distribution of u and x. We restrict ourselves to the potentially sub-optimal assumption that x = u, under which, the following rate is achievable with perfect secrecy Rs = max I(x; y)-I(x; z) p(x) (4) R_s would have been equivalent to the secrecy capacity Cs, if the main channel was "more capable than the eavesdropping channel [2]. p(x) must be chosen to maximize (4), but we restrict ourselves to the class of Gaussian pdfs. Our aim is to characterize the best achievable secrecy rates, under this restriction, and the input power constraint. This is in fact one further potentially sub-optimal assumption that we make, as, Gaussian signalling maximizes both terms on the right hand side of (4), but does not necessarily maximize the difference. Note that in the scalar Gaussian channel studied in [3] , the two assumptions of x = u and x being Gaussian are not suboptimal, as the eavesdropping channel is a degraded version of the main channel.
The optimization problem of interest is now Rs = lo(l + hth) -log(l + gtEg) (5) where E is the covariance matrix for the channel input vector x, and is constrained such that tr(E) < P. There is no 2 1 coefficient before the log terms, as, complex Gaussian vectors are involved. It remains to identify the covariance matrix E that maximizes Rs. This is equivalent to finding the E that maximizes Pi(E) = g h g (6) or, the pair (V, A) that maximizes 1 + atAa I + btAb (7) where E = VAVt is the eigenvalue decomposition for E, a = Vth and b = Vtg. We first show that A should have only one non-zero component, equal to P, and therefore, the optimal E should be unit rank. The optimization function can be rewritten as
For a fixed V, we show that either all eigenvalues are zero, or there is only one nonzero eigenvalue equal to P, depending on the parameters ai and bi 1) If 2 2 ai i<.t (9) then for all values of A, p(E) < 1. Its maximum value p(E) = I happens when A = 0 and the user stays quiet. This situation can be interpreted as the case were the eavesdropping channel is strictly better than the user channel, and therefore, it is not possible to transmit information at any positive rate with perfect secrecy Re = R. The corresponding rate-equivocation region in this case is empty.
2) If for some 1 < i < t, a2 > b2, and there is unused power, increasing Ai will increase p(E). Therefore, if at least for one i, a2 > b2, the user should use all the available power. To show that the power should be used in only one direction, consider any two indices i and < i,j < t. Assume that Ai + Aj = Pij < P. Fixing all other eigenvalues, the optimization function can be written as p(E) a + bAi (10) (0O, + Aj) or (Ai + Aj,U) instead of (Ai,Aj It is well-knoown that the capacity achieving transmission strategy in a peaceful MISO channel without secrecy constraints, is to beamform in the direction of the main channel h [15] . The above result shows that, with the addition of an eavesdropping channel, and the resulting secrecy constraints the optimal strategy is still beamforming, but the beamforming direction q*, is "adjusted" to be as orthogonal to the eavesdropping channel direction as possible, while being as close to the main channel direction as possible. 
Depending on the sign of bc-ad, this function is either monotonically increasing or monotonically decreasing in A. Therefore, in the optimal solution, for any two indices i and 1 < i < t we should have either
We study two situations regarding the availability of the eavesdropper's channel state information. First, we assume that the channel state information of the eavesdropper is also available, similar to the setting used in [11] , [12] . This can also he moti vated y the assumpti that the eavesdropper can be an idle user in a broadcast channel [2] , [4] , therefore, its channel information can be common knowledge just like the receiver channel information. Later, we make the more natural assumption that, only statistical information ahout the channel state of the eavesdropper is available. If the eavesdropping channel state information is avail able the transmitter can design a communication strategy for a set of parallel constant sub-channels corresponding to the set of possible fading levels of the eavesdropping channels, and also choose a power allocation strategy over those sub-channels [ 11] . The communication/equivocation rates at the receiver/eavesdropper, are the average comrnmunication/equivocation rates of the sub-channels [11] , [12] , therefore, the user can choose the optimal strategy over each sub-channel independently. The focus of this paper is on characterizing the optimal strategies at each sub-channel. It is left as future work to determine the optimal power allocation strategies. Each sub-channel is equivalent to the non-fading MISO channel studied in the previous section. Now, assume that there is only statistical information about the channel state of the eavesdropper. Again, the transmitter can design a communication strategy for a set of parallel constant sub-channels corresponding to the set of possible fading levels of the main channel, together with a power allocation strategy over those sub-channels. Again, we focus on characterizing the optimal strategies at each sub-channel and leave the optimal power allocation strategies for future work. Toward that end, assume that the channel of the intended receiver is constant, while the eavesdropper's channel is complex Gaussian fading. 
p(x) As before, we restrict ourselves to Gaussian, potentially suboptimal x, and characterize the best achievable secrecy rates. The optimization problem of interest is therefore Rs(E) = log(l + hth) -Eg [log(1 + gtEg)] first term on the right hand side of (26).
Define a = Vth. 
This in turn shows that, the optimal unitary matrix V, has the unit-norm vector -h-as its first column, and t-I arbitrary normal vectors orthogonal to h, as the rest of its columns. Given the optimal V as characterized above, it remains to find the optimal A. The best achievable rate Rs can be written as a function of A1 At only Rs(A) = log(l + A1 lih 2) -Eg blog (24) where E is the covariance matrix for the channel input vector x, and is constrained such that tr(E) < P, where P is the available input power. Let the eigenvalue decomposition for the input covariance matrix be E = VAVt. The Observe that the choice of Ai, i > 1 only affects the second term on the right hand side of (32). For any fixed A 1, given that Ai and g2 are all non-negative, the second term on the right hand side of (32) is increasing in Ai, while the first term is fixed. Therefore, in order to maximize Rs(A), the user is better off choosing Ai 0 for all i > 1, as the power constraint is tr(E) = tr(A) Ai < P. This, together with (30) and (31), shows that the optimal user strategy is to transmit in the direction of h. where the random variable g has the same distribution as any gi, i = 1, ... . t, and the power constraint is A1 < P.
We now characterize the best choice of A 1 which maximizes Rs. Since there is only one parameter A1 to be determined, we drop the subscript and replace A1 by A. First, observe that both the first and the second terms on the right hand side of (33) 
which shows that, by choosing the right input covariance matrix, positive secrecy rate is achievable if the combined effect of all t components of h is better than a single component of g, which can occur even if h is much worse than g componentwise.
Numerical simulation of Rs(A) as a function of A shows that, depending on the relative quality of the main and the eavesdropping channels, for some values of llh 2 and a,
